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Abstract
For better or worse, neither Congress, the
procuring agencies, the media, nor the public
will condone, conceptually, contractors
reaping excessive profits for government
work. As a result, our current procurement
system employs an unduly complex,
burdensome, and risk-laden system that
ineffectively endeavors to limit excessive
profits.  This statutory and regulatory regime
erects significant barriers to civil/military
integration.
Progressing from our conclusion that the
avoidance of excessive profits is an immutable
characteristic of government procurement, we
acknowledge persistent criticism of, and the
renewed effort to avoid, cost-based
contracting.  This inevitably leads us to
problems associated with the pricing practices
that pervade fixed-price contracting.  We then
examine certain policy implications
associated with the Truth In Negotiations Act
(TINA), the existing audit regime, and the use
of criminal and civil anti-fraud measures to
scrutinize deviations from these complex cost,
pricing, and profit policies and controls.
We then re-visit the Renegotiation Act,
extinct for more than twenty years, and find it
less troubling than the existing quagmire.  We
analogize to recent experience in the public
utilities industry, which increasingly employs
a sharing mechanism as an explicit,
transparent means for addressing “excessive”
profits.  Finally, we make a modest proposal
to simplify and decriminalize Federal
procurement pricing and profit policy that
draws from the historical renegotiation
experience.
We suggest that a transparent
renegotiation regime could be one less
burdensome or complex element of a
regulatory scheme that presents suppliers with
a menu of regulatory options.  Such a
regulatory scheme would allow contractors to
select the approach that best corresponds to
their own assessment of which contractual
rules will minimize their costs.  We conclude
that such a regime could permit the
Government to share, directly or indirectly, in
these increased efficiencies and savings.
Introduction
Both the Defense Department and private
industry aggressively criticize the current
state of contract pricing, cost reimbursement
contracting regulation, and contract profit
policy.  Detractors assert that the statutory
and regulatory regime poses significant
impediments to civil/military integration
(CMI).i  Critics assert that intrusive,
                                                 
i DoD recently ranked numerous cost
drivers, originally identify by a Coopers &
Lybrand/TASC study, in terms of their
priority to CMI.  Category 1 barriers (the
highest priority) included the Truth in
Negotiations Act, Cost Accounting Standards,
Contract Cost Principles, and Contract
burdensome, government-unique
requirements provide barriers to entry by
commercial firms.
While debate continues regarding the true
impact of these barriers, most participants and
observers agree that impediments derive from
the cost and complexities that burden
government-unique requirements associated
with: (1) the disclosure of cost or pricing
information pursuant to the Truth In
Negotiations Act (TINA),ii (2) accounting
allocation rules primarily associated with the
Cost Accounting Standards (CAS),iii and (3)
the allowability of certain incurred costs,
addressed in the regulatory cost principles.iv
Superimposed upon this framework is a
legitimate concern regarding the use of
criminal and civil anti-fraud measures,
primarily through the 1986 amendments to
the False Claims Act (FCA),v to scrutinize
deviations from these complex cost, pricing,
and profit policies and controls.
Viewed from afar, the existing maze of
statutes and regulations that affect contract
pricing seem unduly complex, burdensome,
and, in the case of potential sanctions, risky,
                                                                         
Administration and Reporting.  See, e.g., DoD
Ranks Cost Drivers’ Impact on Civil-Military
Integration, 40 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 550
(December 9, 1998).
ii 10 U.S.C. § 2306a; 41 U.S.C. § 254b.
iii See generally, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 50
U.S.C. app. § 2168; 41 U.S.C. § 422; Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Appendix B,
48 C.F.R. Part 9904.
iv Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
Part 31, 48 C.F.R. Part 31.
v 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730; 18 U.S.C. §
287.
given their intended purpose.  Arguably, these
various mechanisms serve merely to ensure
that contractors do not make “too much”
profit on government contracts.  There must
be a better way.
For the purposes of this paper, we do not
attempt to distinguish “excessive” profits
from those deemed “exploitative.”  The
adjectives are neither meaningful nor
relevant.  As discussed below, Congress has
repeatedly demonstrated its ability to set
broad, sweeping, seemingly arbitrary,
percentage-based limits on contractor profits.
In this paper, we do not seek to add to such an
ffort.
Nor do we advocate for profit controls
generally. Rather, we begin from the
assumption that the community – whether
C ngress, the procuring agencies, the media,
or the public – will not tolerate, conceptually,
contractors reaping excessive profits for
government work. Faced with that reality, we
propose a streamlined, equitable system to
e fectuate this policy.
In this brief paper, we assert that the
Government, for better or worse, is incapable
of tolerating excessive contractor profits.  We
suggest that our current unduly complex,
burdensome, and risk-laden system
ineffectively endeavors to limit excessive
profits.  We re-visit the Renegotiation Act,
extinct for more than twenty years, and find it
less troubling than the existing quagmire.
Finally, we make a modest proposal to
simplify and decriminalize pricing and profit
policy and practice that draws from the
renegotiation experience.
Government Fixation With Avoiding
Excessive Profit, Or Having Their Cake
and Eating It Too
We begin by suggesting that the
avoidance of contractors obtaining excessive
profits is an immutable characteristic of
government procurement.vi  Twentieth
centrury American history is replete will
failed attempts to curb wartime contractor
profits.vii Statutory profit ceilings date back to
the passage of the Vinson-Trammel Act of
1934viii and the Merchant Marine Act of
1936.ix  In 1942, the Supreme Court
bemoaned the problem but left no doubt that
Congress, not the courts, possessed the power
and responsibility to address the concern.x
                                                 
vi See, generally, Hult Lawrence Wilson,
Renegotiation: Pro and Con, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 376, 377-78 (1944),
asserting that one point of agreement is “the
immorality of excessive profits.”
vii   See generally, H. Struve Hensel &
Richard G. McClung, Profit Limitation
Controls Prior to the Present War, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 187 (1944); Glen A. Lloyd,
Pricing in War Contracts, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 235 (1944).
viii 48 Stat. 505 (March 27, 1934)
(capping Navy contract profits at ten percent).
Later iterations of the Vinson-Trammel Act
altered coverage and profit rates.  49 Stat.
1926 (June 25, 1936); 53 Stat. 555, 560, 590
(April 3, 24, 25, 1939); 54 Stat. 676, 677
(June 28, 1940).  See also W. John Kenney,
Coverage and Exemptions, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 262 (1944) (discussing
these statutes and the Renegotiation Act).
ix 49 Stat. 1985, 1998 (June 29, 1936)
(limiting ship construction contract profit to
ten percent).
x “The profits made in these . . .
contracts may justly arouse indignation. . . .
But if the Executive is in need of additional
laws to protect the nation against war
profiteering, the Constitution has given to
Congress, not to this Court, the power to
make them[.]” United States v. Bethlehem
Prior to passage of the first profit
renegotiation statute, Congress considered
statutory profit limitations (at varying levels),
excess profit taxes, renegotiation, and other
options.  In a representative expression of
outrage at “parasites” engaged in “nefarious
practices,” Representative J.W. Ditter of
Pennsylvania, explained:
The problem to which I refer . . . is
the elimination of exorbitant or
excessive profits on war contracts. . .
. [N]othing more than a reasonable
return on capital and on ability,
bearing in mind the degree of risk
involved in both, should accrue to
any man . . . as a result of the
national peril.  The trite phrase --
take the profits out of war -- should
mean just what it says. . . [W]e have
evidence at hand of the existence of
what has been very properly termed
“blood money[.]”xi
This sentiment is neither confined to wartime
exigency, nor is it consistent with capitalistic
notions of the role of profit in markets.
When DoD introduced its “weighted
guidelines,” now more than thirty years ago, it
touted profit as the engine that drives
                                                                         
Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 308-309 (1942).
See generally, James F. Nagle, A HISTORY OF
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING, 350-353, 439-
442 (1992).
xi Excerpts from Debate in House of
Representatives on Adoption of Conference
Report on H.R. 6868, 77th Cong., Cong. Rec.
of April 21, 1942, 3695-3712, reprinted in
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
RENEGOTIATION OF WAR CONTRACTS, LAW,
DEBATES, AND OTHER LEGISLATIVE
MATERIALS, 100-101 (Barron K. Grier,
Compilation, 1943).
successful contractual performance.  DoD
articulated that its policy was “to utilize profit
to stimulate efficient contract performance.
Profit . . . is the basic motive of business
enterprise. . .  Negotiation of very low profits
. . . . does not provide the motivation to
accomplish such performance. . . [L]ow
average profit rates on defense contracts
overall are detrimental to the public
interest.”xii  Professor Nash, at the time,
suggested that the new policy intended not
only to use profit to better motivate
performance, but also to establish profit rates
at levels more fair to contractors.xiii  These
                                                 
xii ASPR 3-808.I(a) (1963).
xiii Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Pricing Policies in
Government Contracts, 29 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 361, 372-373 (1964).  Professor Nash
also detailed the inexorable reduction in profit
rates on defense contracts, charting a steady
decline in profit rates from 6.36 percent in
1956 to a startling 2.94 percent in 1963.  Id. at
370, note 30, extracting data from the Annual
Reports to Congress submitted by the
Renegotiation Board.  See also RALPH C.
NASH & JOHN CIBINIC, JR., PROFIT PLANNING
(Geo. Wash. Univ. undated course book, circa
1964-65), summarizing the net profits of the
twenty largest DoD contractors (accounting
for 46.5% of total DoD procurement) in 1962.
The highest net profits reported in 1962, were
General Motors, with a 10% net profit on
sales and General Dynamics, with a 31% net
profit based on invested capital.  At the same
time, it was observed that, under the new
rules, “there is an insufficient profit . . . to
cover product development costs,
contingencies implicit in a ‘proprietary
product’ business, and other ‘unallowable’
costs, if at the same time a fair return to the
contractor’s stockholders is to be provided. . .
. [I]n practice anything more than a modest
profit, ranging somewhere in the
neighborhood of plus or minus ten percent on
fixed-price jobs, is unacceptable. . .” Walter
same principles are embodied today in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).xiv This
policy, however, is articulated in the same
section describing the long-standing, but
seemingly arbitrary, profit limitations which
Congress has set for various categories of
contracts.xv
A chasm exists between the stated policy
and current practice, and the Government
cannot (or at least should not be able to) have
it both ways.xvi  In much of its current
                                                                         
F. Pettit, The Defective Pricing Law and
Implementing Regulations – A Year and a
Half Later, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 552,
561-62 (1964).
xiv FAR 15.404- (a)(2) explains that: “It
is in the Government's interest to offer
contractors opportunities for financial rewards
sufficient to stimulate efficient contract
performance, attract the best capabilities of
qualified large and small business concerns to
Government contracts, and maintain a viable
industrial base.” FAR 15.404-4(a) warns:
“Both the Government and contractors should
be concerned with profit as a motivator of
efficient and effective contract performance.
Negotiations aimed merely at reducing prices
by reducing profit, without proper recognition
of the function of profit, are not in the
Government's interest.”
xv See FAR 15.404-4(c)(4)(i), which
prohibits contracting officers from negotiating
prices or fees exceeding the statutory
limitations in 10 U.S.C. § 2306 and 41 U.S.C.
§ 254, of 15 percent for experimental,
developmental, or research work performed
under cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts; 6
percent for architect-engineer services; and 10
percent for other CPFF contracts.
xvi See e.g., Joshua I, Schwartz,
Assembling Winstar: Triumph of the Ideal of
Congruence in Government Contracts Law?,
rhetoric, the Government implies that it is
willing to buy commercial items and act as
any other party to a commercial
transaction.xvii  Yet, only the naive could
believe that Congress or the public will be
any more tolerant of profits deemed excessive
simply because they were reaped by
“commercial” firms or derived from
“commercial item” purchases.
Complexity and Criminalization: Potential
Barriers To Entry For Commercial Firms
                                                                         
26 PUB. CONT. L. J. 481 (1997); Joshua I,
Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts:
Congruence and Exceptionalism in
Government Contracts Law, 64 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 633, 674-76 (1996) (contrasting a
“congruence principle” in government
contract law -- that in its contractual relations
the government’s rights and duties resemble
those of private parties -- with an
“exceptionalistic” principle -- that the
government can, for example, annul
agreements based upon federal police, or
some other paramount, power).
xvii See generally, Steven Kelman, Buyi g
Commercial: An Introduction and
Framework, 27 PUB. CONT. L. J. 249 (1998);
William P. McNally, Will Commercial
Specifications Meet Our Future Air Power
Needs?, ACQUISITION REVIEW QUARTERLY
297 (Summer 1998); Michael Heberling, J.
Ronald McDonald, R. Michael Nanzer, Eric
Rebentisch & Kimberly Sterling, Using
Commercial Suppliers - Barriers and
Opportunities, PROGRAM MANAGER 48
(July/August 1998); Michael H. Anderson &
Eric Rebentisch, Commercial
Practices-Dilemma or Opportunity?,
PROGRAM MANAGER 16 (March/April 1998);
Michael E. Heberling & Mary E. Kinsella,
Remaining Issues in Adopting Commercial
Practices in Defense Acquisition, 38 CONT.
MGMT. 13 (February 1998).
Whether due to an irrational obsession
with avoidance of excess profits or a well-
intentioned effort to ensure that the
Government obtains the best value for its
procurement dollar, the result has been the
same.  Our current procurement system
imposes significant barriers to entry to
commercial firms. Although these barriers
may differ based upon the type of contractual
vehicle employed -- for example the use of
cost-based versus fixed-price contracts -- the
symptoms are similar: complex, resource
intensive compliance requirements with
corresponding risks.
Cost-Based Contracting; Neither Poison
Nor Panacea
Cost reimbursement contracting arguably
reduces the risks contractors must assume
when uncertainties in contract performance do
not permit costs to be estimated with
sufficient accuracy to use any type of
fixed-price contract.  These contractual
vehicles obligate the Government to
reimburse contractors for their allowable
incurred costs, typically within a stipulated
ceiling.xviii  Recent acquisition reform effort
and energy, however, have focused upon
reducing the use of cost-based contracting.xix
Criticisms of cost-based pricing are
neither new nor novel.  As early as 1943, the
Truman Committee concluded that:
“Experience has shown ‘cost-plus’ contracts
to be worse than worthless in the effort to
prevent excessive costs.  They strongly tend
to increase costs instead of the reverse.”xx
                                                 
xviii FAR 16.301-1, 16.301-2.
xix   See e.g., John Cibinic, “Cost-Based”
Contracting: On the Way Out?, 12 NASH &
CIBNIC REP. ¶ 58 (November 1998).
xx Senate Rep. No. 10, Part 5, p.2, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess., March 30, 1943. For
Further, the infrastructure required to
administer and comply with the regulatory
requirements associated with cost-based
contracting absorb a significant portion of the
Government’s investment in these contracts.
Nonetheless, it appears unlikely that the
end of cost-based contracting is near.
Elimination of this contracting option seems
impracticable absent a sufficient alternative to
insulate contractors from assuming excessive
financial risk on large, development projects
that, for example, seek to expand the state of
the art.  Further, wholesale change “will
require a cultural change of immense
proportions and a major cleanup of the FAR”
regulatory scheme.xxi  Nonetheless, it appears
reasonable to expect the pendulum to
continue to swing towards a preference for
fixed-price vehicles.  In either event, energy
must be devoted to reducing the
administrative and compliance burdens
associated with either type of pricing
mechanism.
Fixed-Price Contracts in Theory and
Practice
Fixed-price contracts (FFP) commit the
supplier to perform the contract at a specific
price, regardless of actual performance costs.
The FAR describes the incentive features of
FFP contracts as placing:upon the contractor
the maximum risk and full responsibility for
all costs and resulting profit or loss.  It
provides maximum incentive for the
contractor to control costs and perform
effectively and imposes a minimum
                                                                         
background on the Truman Committee, see
James F. Nagle, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTING, 423-25, 440-441 (1992).
xxi John Cibinic, “Cost-Based”
Contracting: On the Way Out?, 12 NASH &
CIBNIC REP. ¶ 58 at 174 (November 1998).
administrative burden upon the contracting
parties.xxii
The contractor thus absorbs all overruns and,
conversely, retains all amounts by which
actual performance costs underrun the
contract price.
FFP contracts maximize incentives to
contr l costs only if the contracting parties
beli ve that renegotiation of the contract price
is allowed only when (1) renegotiation is
contemplated by the express terms of the
original agreement and takes place pursuant
to a mechanism specified in the agreement; or
(2) contingencies during performance satisfy
the strict requirements of contract law
doctrines governing impossibility and
unforseeability.xxiii
Efforts to renegotiate terms outside these
circumstances can weaken incentives to
comply with the original contract terms in any
one procurement episode; diminish the
willingness of firms to contract with entities
that have a reputation for attempting to reopen
the original terms; or induce the parties to
take costly precautions to account for the
possibility that renegotiation will occur.
The Truth In Negotiations Act: A
Microcosm Reflecting The Larger Problem
If the current compliance regime derives
from the Government’s efforts to avoid
paying excess profits, TINA could not be
more inefficient.  If the Government truly
desires to procure based upon best value, the
information obtained during the negotiation
                                                 
xxii FAR 16.202-1.
xxiii See generally, Steven L. Schooner,
Impossibility of Performance in Public
Contracts: An Economic Analysis, 16 PUB.
CONT. L. J. 229 (1986).
process must be deemed irrelevant.  Further,
while only the successful offeror must certify
its cost or pricing data, all offerors prepare the
data as part of the proposal preparation
process.
The Content and Purpose of the Truth in
Negotiations Act
TINA stemmed from Congressional
concerns that suppliers with sole-source
contracts will negotiate excessive fixed prices
with DOD because the lack of rivalry for the
contracts at issue prevents market forces from
exerting sufficient discipline over costs.
TINA often applies to long-term production
contracts for weapon systems, where DOD
annually negotiates purchases with a sole
supplier.
TINA compels contractors in negotiated
procurements to reveal accurate, current, and
complete "cost or pricing" data up to the time
that the parties agree on the contract price.
Cost or pricing data consists of all facts that
“a prudent buyer or seller would reasonably
expect to affect price negotiations
significantly.”xxiv  The contractor need not
supply information that is “judgmental” but
must reveal all facts on which its judgments
rest.xxv  TINA does not apply to acquisitions
                                                 
xxiv 10 U.S.C. § 2306(h)(1); 41 U.S.C. §
254b(i)(1); FAR 15.401.  See also Jeffrey A.
Lovitky, Understanding the Submission
Requirement for Cost or Pricing Data, 21
NAT’L CONT. MGMT. J. 57 (Summer 1987);
Jeffrey A. Lovitky, Cost or Pricing Data
Defined: An Analysis of the Scope of
Contractor Disclosure Requirements
Pursuant to the Truth in Negotiations Act, 20
NAT’L CONT. MGMT. J. 79 (Winter 1987).
xxv “Cost or pricing data are f ctual, not
judgmental; and are verifiable. While they do
not indicate the accuracy of the prospective
contractor's judgment about estimated future
below the simplified acquisition thresholdxxvi
or procurements where the contract price is
based on (a) “adequate price competition,” (b)
established catalogue or market prices of
commercial items sold in substantial
quantitites to the general public, or (c) prices
set by law or regulation.xxvii
Contractors typically must certify that
they have made the required disclosures.
Price increases attributable to a failure to
make the requisite disclosures constitute
“d fective pricing” and entitle DOD to
recapture each dollar of overcharges caused
by a nondisclosure.xxviii  Inaccurate
certifications also can trigger or elicit
formidable civil and criminal sanctions where
the inaccurate certification contained a
deliberate misrepresentation or displayed a
reckless disregard for the truth.xxix  DOD uses
xtensive ex ante and ex post auditing tools to
                                                                         
costs or projections, they do include the data
forming the basis for that judgment.”  FAR
15.401.  See also, Jeffrey A. Lovitky,
Understanding Causation and Determining
the Price Adjustment in Defective Pricing
Cases, 17 PUB. CONT. L. J. 407 (1988).
xxvi FAR 15.403-1(a).  The simplified
acquisition threshold, currently $100,000, is
established by Pub. L. No. 103-355.  See also
FAR Part 13's discussion of simplified
acquisition procedures.
xxvii See generally, FAR 15.403-1.
xxviii See FAR 15.407-1, 15.408(b), (c); and
the PRICE REDUCTION FOR DEFECTIVE
COST OR PRICING clauses at FAR 52.215-
10 and 52.215-11.
xxix See generally, SEYFARTH, SHAW,
FAIRWEATHER & GERALDSON, THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT COMPLIANCE
HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1991 & 1996 Supp.).
determine whether the contractor has
provided data subject to disclosure.
The likelihood that an audit can discover
a TINA violation for any single contract is
substantial, particularly for major weapons
programs.  In the period leading to an
agreement on price, weapon suppliers daily
generate large volumes of relevant
information from internal sources and from
external vendors.  Exhaustive, expensive,
post-negotiation “sweeps,” intended to verify
all conceivable data points, rarely prove
foolproof.  Items of cost or pricing data that
are not supplied to DOD's negotiation team
violate the disclosure requirement.  The
preparation and negotiation of pricing
proposals provide many events that may
constitute technical violations of the
disclosure requirements.
The Truth in Negotiations Act as a
Renegotiation Mechanism
A contractor's main incentive to commit
itself to a fixed-price contract is the
opportunity to keep amounts by which its
costs underrun the contract price.  Well-
conceived price levels incorporate
productivity improvement assumptions that
allow DOD to benefit from productivity gains
but still give the contractor strong incentives
to achieve cost reductions that depress its
actual costs below the fixed price.  If the
supplier greatly reduces its costs for any
single contract, it will realize substantial
profits for that contract.
DOD can react to these profits in two
ways.  The first is to treat a discrete period of
high profits as unremarkable.  High profits
may result simply from superior performance,
including efforts to improve productivity.
The second reaction is to regard a period
of high profits as proof that the contractor
manipulated the establishment of the fixed
price.  (This assumes, unfortunately and
incorrectly, that generous contractor profits
somehow must be inconsistent with the
Government obtaining best value.)   If it
accepts the second hypothesis, DOD might
dramatically adjust the fixed price downward
in future contract periods or renegotiate x
post to capture some of the returns from cost
reduction in the initial contract period.
TINA induces contractors to reveal
private information about anticipated costs.
TINA's efficiency effects depend heavily on
what the auditors regard as adequate
information disclosures and how DOD
responds to insufficient disclosures.  One
possible response is to treat high profits as
proof that the contractor has failed to make
mandated pre-contractual disclosures.  High
profits on individual contracts could trigger
careful ex post audits of contractor data to
determine whether the firm withheld
information that, if disclosed during pre-
contractual negotiations, would have led
DOD to insist on a lower fixed price.
In practice, perceived contractor failures
to make required disclosures usually result in
efforts to recover the amount by which the
contractor overstated its costs.  Most annual
production contracts for major weapon
systems undergo extensive ex post audits to
determine whether disclosures mandated by
TINA were adequate.  Since the early 1980s,
the government has resorted increasingly to
civil and criminal investigations premised on
the view that nondisclosure was deliberate
and done to defraud the government.
Price-ceiling regimes that enable
regulators to recapture all or part of amounts
by which the firm's earned rate of return
exceeds a specific norm are not unique to
g vernment procurement.  What distinguishes
defense contracting are two features of the
enforcement mechanism.  First, DOD can
threaten to commence a civil or criminal fraud
inquiry to recapture excess returns.  Second,
the Civil False Claims Act empowers a
contractor's employees to challenge apparent
violations of the law.xxx
DOD audits unquestionably uncover
some instances of willful contractor efforts to
conceal data subject to disclosure duties.  Yet
DOD's use of TINA sometimes seems to
support the hypothesis that the Government is
renegotiating original contract terms and is
seeking to obtain ex post a more favorable
disposition of the surplus generated by
contractor cost-cutting.
The certainty of probing, ex post analysis
of actual cost experience could influence
contractors in several ways.  First, it could
induce limit pricing by which firms forego
efforts in any single negotiation to get the
highest fixed price possible.  Weapons
programs often are repeat games consisting of
a series of one-year contracts.xxxi  Firms may
realize that high returns in one year may
provoke x post sanctions or lead DOD to
impose severe price ceilings in future years.
                                                 
xxx See William E. Kovacic,
Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as
Monitoring Devices in Government
Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799
(1996).   Despite ongoing industry efforts to
dilute the FCA provisions, it appears that any
momentum in that direction may have
dissipated.  Melanie I. Dooley, DoD Drops
Plan to Seek Statutory Changes to False
Claims Act: Attorney General Offers to Draft
Guidelines for Handling Fraud Cases, 71
FED. CONT. REP. 247 (February 22, 1999).
xxxi See Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J.
Reynolds, The Efficiency of Incomplete
Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air
Force Engine Procurement, 24 RAND J.
ECON. 126 (1993).
Second, the prospect of renegotiation
m y diminish contractor efforts to cut costs in
a y one period, as cost reduction that boosts
the return on the contract to levels
unacceptable to DOD is likely to elicit
unfavorable scrutiny.  Firms may reduce
efforts to achieve dramatic productivity gains
or may be more inclined to tolerate
expenditures that needlessly increase costs
and reduce the overall return on the contract
to levels DOD deems appropriate.  Such
caution would tend to impede bold efforts to
cut costs and otherwise improve productivity.
Third, the possibility that the
Government might seek criminal sanctions
against the firm and individual employees can
result in costly investments in administrative
safeguards to ensure that even inadvertent
nondisclosures of information do not occur.
Suppliers also may delay the negotiation
process to determine that strict compliance
with TINA has been achieved before an
agreement on price is reached.
Barring Congressional repeal of TINA --
an unlikely occurrence -- what alternatives are
vailable to permit the Government to
insulate itself from excessive profit, while
reducing the administrative burdens and risks
of criminal sanctions that pose formidable
barriers to entry into the Federal procurement
marketplace?  Perhaps history provides a
useful analogy.
Revisiting The Renegotiation Act and
Renegotiation Board.
Commencing in the early 1940's and, in
various iterations until its expiration in
1976,xxxii  the statutory renegotiation scheme
offered a global vehicle for addressing many
of the concerns articulated above.  Congress
created renegotiation powers to ensure that
the Government could fulfill its needs at fair
prices during wartime.  Basically,
renegotiation permitted the Government to
recover an amount determined to reflect a
defense (or space) contractor’s “excessive
profits.”xxxiii  An independent Renegotiation
Board administered the program from 1951
until 1979, when Congress ceased funding the
Board.  Congress permitted the Government’s
renegotiation authority to lapse in 1976.
                                                 
xxxii “[R]epeated extensions of the act for
short periods -- generally for approximately
two years -- has been detrimental to the
morale of the [Renegotiation] Board’s
personnel and to the proper functioning of the
renegotiation process. . . .” Andrew C. Mayer,
Renegotiation, Congressional Research
Service No. 77-136F, at i-ii (May 25, 1977).
xxxiii 50 U.S.C. § 1213, et seq.  See
generally, RALPH C. NASH, JR. & JOHN
CIBINIC, JR. FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW,
1996-2026 (Vol. II, 3d ed. 1980).  For more
extensive history and analysis, see WALTER E.
BARTON, RENEGOTIATION OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS (1952); HUDSON B. COX,
RENEGOTIATION OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS UNDER THE 1951 AND 1948
RENEGOTIATION ACTS (1951); William L.
Marbury & Robert R. Bowie, Renegotiation
and Procurement, 10 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 218 (1944); Jules Abels, The 1943
Revenue Bill’s Renegotiation Proposals, 10
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 399 (1944).
History may recall that renegotiation
served its purpose well, permitting significant
recoveries for the public fisc.xxxiv Critics
u successfully challenged renegotiation as
unconstitutionalxxxv or as abuse of sovereign
power.xxxvi
                                                 
xxxiv From 1954 to 1958, during the Korean
War, annual determinations of excessive
profits averaged $140 million.  ($140M
recovered in 1956 equates to approximately
$758M in 1998 dollars.)  After the
Renegotiation Act was amended, permitting a
five-year carry-forward, annual
determinations of excessive profits averaged
$32.1 million until 1976.    ($32M recovered
in 1975 equates to more than $90M in 1998
dollars.)  RALPH C. NASH, JR. & JOHN
CIBINIC, JR. FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW,
1998 (Vol. II, 3d ed. 1980).  Current year
dollars are calculated using NASA’s Gross
Domestic Product Deflator Inflation
Calculator, available at
<http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflate.html>
(visited December 11, 1998).
xxxv Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742
(1948) (constitutionality of Renegotiation Act
upheld); Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v.
Renegotiation Board, 383 F.2d 690 (4th Cir.
1967) (Renegotiation Act of 1951 was
“necessary and proper” and “within the
constitutional power of Congress.).  See also,
Charles S. Collier, Constitutionality of
Statutory Renegotiation, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 375 (1944) (“the most
hopeful basis for attack [seems] to be, not the
basic constitutionality of the statute, but the
maladministration thereof in specific cases. . .
.”).
xxxvi Hult Lawrence Wilson, Renegotiation:
Pro and Con, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
376, 385-95 (1944).
It is both interesting and significant that,
in determining excessive profits, one of the
primary factors was risk -- higher profits rates
were permitted for firms whose business
entailed comparatively higher risks.
Favorable treatment in this regard typically
was denied to contractors under cost
reimbursement agreements.xxxvii
One attractive component of the
renegotiation regime was that determinations
and recoveries were not contract specific.xxxviii
Rather, a composite fiscal year assessment of
all of a firm’s business provided the base for
renegotiation.  Losses on individual contracts
could offset more profitable contracts.   One
less attractive component is that, like its
present day successors, renegotiation
procedures appear, at some level, intricate,
complex, burdensome, and time-
consuming.xxxix
                                                 
xxxvii See, e.g., Mason & Hanger-Silas
Mason Co. v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 106,
518 F.2d 1341 (1975) (profits in excess of
two percent deemed excessive where
contractor “incurred virtually no risk and
invested very little capital of its own”); Page-
River-Curran v. United States, 216 Ct. Cl.
246, 574 F.2d 1063 (1978) (contractor’s
entitlement to profit on government furnished
material (GFM) is lesser than on materials the
contractor supplies).
xxxviii The original statute, passed in 1942,
provided for renegotiation on a contract-by-
contract basis.  Sixth Supplemental National
Defense Appropriation Act, § 403, 56 Stat.
245.  An amendment in October of 1942,
however, converted renegotiation to a fiscal
year basis.  Revenue Act of 1942, § 801, 56
Stat. 982.
xxxix Carman G. Blough, Renegotiation
Standards and Practices, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 276 (1944); Paul B. Boyd,
Administrative Machinery and Procedures for
The DoD Repricing Rule: An Unintended
Analogy.
In an unpopular move, DoD recently
suggested use of a re-opener or repricing
c ause in noncompetitive fixed-price contracts
affected by pending or recent mergers or
business combinations.xl   DoD asserted that –
from the time a merger or acquisition is
announced until the putative savings from the
business combination are reflected in reduced
overhead rates – fixed-price contracts are
risky.  Not surprisingly, industry opposition
has been swift and fierce.xli  Much of the
criticism focused upon the suggested
“downward only” nature of the adjustments
contemplated by the new rule.  (Although, by
historical analogy, public sentiment has never
prompted Congress to mandate renegotiation
of insufficiently profitable contracts.)
Likewise, critics complained that the
Government was introducing another avenue
                                                                         
Renegotiation, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
276 (1944); Wadsworth Watts, Renegotiation
and Federal Taxation, 10 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 341 (1944).
xl See e.g., DoD Proposes Reopener
Clause In Response to GAO Study on Defense
Industry Restructuring, 40 GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 551 (December 9, 1998);
GAO Presses for Mandatory “Reopener”
Clauses To Capture Restructuring Savings,
40 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 347 (July 22, 1998)
(discussing the GAO Report, Defense
I dustry: Restructuring Costs Paid, Savings
Realized and Means to Ensure Benefits,
NSIAD-99-22, December 1, 1998, and
DoD’s response); 63 Fed. Reg. 65727
(November 30, 1998).
xli See, e.g., Restructuring Costs: ABA
Group Urges DoD to Scrap Proposed Rule on
Use of Repricing Clause, 71 FED. CONT. REP.
219 (Feb. 15, 1999).
permitting the adjustment of fixed-price
contracts.  This example proves telling, when
juxtaposed against the historical example of
renegotiation.
Both complaints, to a great extent, would
be ameliorated by one key facet of
renegotiation – the focus upon the individual
firm’s entire business base, rather than
individual contracts.  The Defense
Department’s claim -- based upon the forward
pricing rates applied to an individual contract
-- may seem to lack a sufficient nexus to the
restructuring costs allowed on various
contracts.  Conversely, a more compelling
case could be made that, to the extent that
DoD subsidized – either directly or indirectly
– defense firms’ restructuring costs, it is
reasonable for them to share in the long term
savings associated with the firms’ enhanced
efficiency or productivity.  Conversely, if
other considerations, such as reduced business
opportunities or competition from new
entrants into the marketplace, resulted in
restructured firms failing to recognize
anticipated savings or efficiencies (on a firm-
wide basis), DoD’s argument seems less
compelling.
An Analogy to Public Utilities and
Telecommunications
Recent developments in the field of
public utility regulation offer another point of
comparison.xlii Since the mid-1980's,
regulation of electrical power and
telecommunications services providers has
                                                 
xlii See William E. Kovacic, Commitment
in Regulation; Defense Contracting and
Extensions to Price Caps, 3 J. REG. ECON.
219 (1991).  See also the attempt to describe
the defense industry as a public utility in
CARL MICHAEL MAYER, GOVERNMENT
PROFIT POLICY 5-6 (Federal Publications
course book October 1990).
featured a shift from cost-based, rate of return
ov rsight to “price cap” mechanisms that
resemble fixed-price contracts between
regulated firms and their regulators.
Recognizing that utilities might realize
po itically insupportable profits under price
cap systems, some jurisdictions have adopted
“sharing” mechanisms, by which net returns
are distributed between the utility and its
ratepayers by a predetermined ratio.  The
sh ing mechanism supplies an explicit,
nsparent means for treating “excessive”
profits.
A Modest Proposal
In this brief paper, we do not advocate a
sentimental revival of the Renegotiation Act.
Rather we propose a study or examination of
alternative methodologies for addressing the
Government’s obsession with the avoidance
of paying excessive profits.  At this
preliminary stage, we suggest a three-tiered
menu of options.
The first option would permit contractors
to elect to remain within the current regime.
They can accept the current system, warts and
all.  We do not doubt than many experienced
contractors, and their counsel, would accept
the existing pitfalls, disincentives,
inefficiencies, and inconsistencies between
contracts within business units, on the theory
that the devil you know is better than one you
don’t. Obviously, where appropriate, they
could and should seek commercial item
exceptions, where appropriate.
The primary alternative would bring the
Government as close as practicable to true
commercial contracting, within a modified
renegotiation regime agreed to by contract
clause.  The contractor would be exempt from
TINA and CAS requirements, along with all
price-related certifications and
representations.  Part of the contractual
agreement would be to permit the DCAA to
perform, on an annual basis, a limited audit --
most likely in conjunction with the firm’s
independent auditors.  Where a firm’s
cumulative profit exceeded the (yet
unspecified) tolerable threshold, the firm
would submit to renegotiation procedures.
Such procedures would provide for some
level of due process, for example, appeal
rights under the Contract Disputes Act of
1978 (CDA).xliii  We would discourage the
creation of a renegotiation board or similar
entity until a need was established.
A middle ground might also ease the
transition.  The basic premise would follow
the model of the Contractor System
Purchasing Review (CPSR),xliv which
correlates oversight directly to compliance
past performance.  Basically, less contractor
compliance prompts greater government
review.  Consistent compliance is rewarded
by reduced reporting and oversight.
Contractors with strong compliance records
could apply for “renegotiation only” status, as
described above.  For contractors in whom the
Government has less confidence, they could
accept a voluntary “rehabilitation option,”
which included situation-specific elements of
full TINA, CAS, or audit oversight.  This
                                                 
xliii 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613.
xliv See generally, FAR Subpart 44.3.  The
CPSR is intended to “evaluate the efficiency
and effectiveness with which the contractor
spends Government funds and complies with
Government policy when subcontracting[.]”
FAR 44.301.  The need for a CPSR is
determined “based on, but not limited to, the
past performance of the contractor[.]”  FAR
44.302.  The CPSR surveillance “plan should
also provide for reviewing the effectiveness
of the contractor's corrective actions taken as
a result of previous Government
recommendations.”  FAR 44.304.
option would mandate strict time periods for
upgraded status in the absence of
demonstrated compliance deficiencies.
We expect individual contractors
primarily would select the regime perceived
to reduce their overall costs, thus optimizing
their competitive standing.  Not all
contractors would choose the same path.
Initially, some firms might choose to operate
within the existing environment, a regime
they understand or believe they have
mastered.  Such an approach would capitalize
upon existing investments or sunk costs in
CAS-complaint accounting systems or
approved compliance programs, with
customized training and controls.
Other firms might deduce that the ability
to jettison their existing accounting and
compliance burdens under the renegotiation
regime could create a needed competitive
edge, either through lower prices offered to
the Government, or increased investment in
facilities or research and development.  Savvy
firms may aspire to “earn” the least possible
government oversight, advertising their
positive compliance rating as firms today tout
heir quality standards.   In any event, we
sense that such an election would convey
valuable information about individual firms
and what image they seek to project to the
Government and the public.
Conclusions
Modern procurement regulation relies
upon a complex, costly system of controls to
limit contractor earnings.  Despite its own
limitations, the use of an explicit, transparent
renegotiation mechanism may improve
efficiency by providing a less costly apparatus
to satisfy the political (and, in some instances,
conomic) need to control supplier profits.  A
transparent renegotiation system could be one
element of a regulatory scheme that presents
suppliers with a menu of regulatory options.
Such a regulatory scheme would allow
contractors to select an approach that best
corresponds to their own assessment of which
contractual rules will minimize their costs.
Directly or indirectly, the Government would
share in those savings.
